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1 Introduction
During the last three decades, fiscal decentralisation (FD) and local-government reform
have been at the centre-stage of policy experiments. This has occurred not only in countries
with a traditional tendency to decentralise, such as the United States, but also in a large
number of developing and transition economies, such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America
(The World Bank, 1999). FD, which moves the responsibility for decision-making in public
expenditure from central to local governments, is widely believed to be an effective tool for
improving the efficiency of public expenditure. One of the major transmission channels,
well documented in the literature, is yardstick competition, through which FD regulates
the behaviour of Leviathan government (Besley and Case, 1995; Belleflamme and Hindriks,
2005; Besley and Smart, 2007; Bordignon et al., 2004); see Lockwood (2005) for a recent
review.
The literature focuses on the benefits of FD; in contrast we explore a negative aspect.
We argue that under asymmetric information, the yardstick competition of capability be-
tween local governments (due to FD) turns into a competition for a better image, i.e. a
‘dress-up contest’. This is because voters with limited information cannot observe the
politicians’ capability; they instead infer this capability from the public service provided.
This motivates politicians to allocate more resources to the public goods that can best
demonstrate their capability. The dress-up contest can lead to a structural bias in public
expenditure, which may result in a distortion of social welfare.
This paper has two main contributions. First, we propose and model dress-up contests
that occur between local governments and are caused by FD. From Rogoff (1990) and
Mani and Mukand (2007) we borrow the visibility concept in a two-politician model. Public
goods are ‘invisible’ if they do not provide a good indication of politicians’ capability, either
because they are difficult to observe or because they are determined by factors beyond the
government’s control. Mani and Mukand (2007) showed that a government tends to spend
more on visible projects than invisible projects, since voters infer its capability from visible
projects. This is referred to as the visibility effect. We extend their model by introducing
yardstick competition between two politicians. Using a one-shot game, we show that
yardstick competition motivates the politicians to start a dress-up contest. To win more
support in an election, they allocate more resources (public expenditure and effort) to the
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more visible goods, since these goods demonstrate their capability and provide a better
image, given a binding fiscal budget constraint. In this sense, the yardstick competition
turns into a competition for a better image, and FD can intensify this dress-up contest.
Our model is related to the tax competition model (see for example Janeba and Peters
(1999), Cai and Treisman (2005), and Zissimos and Wooders (2008)), but our conclusion
is rather different. In the tax-competition literature, the mobility of capital motivates
governments to promote public services. Using a similar framework, we show that the
mobility of information may not always be positive, because it can distort the structure of
public expenditure and lead to a welfare loss.
Second, we provide strong empirical evidence for public-expenditure distortion in visible
and invisible goods, and we also find that this distortion caused by FD can result in a
social welfare loss. To the best of our knowledge, although the visibility effect has been
theoretically established, no research has empirically verified this effect, possibly because of
the difficulty of finding good empirical proxies. In this paper, we investigate the FD effect
on the regional poverty rate, an important aspect of social welfare. We propose to use cash
assistance to the poor as a proxy for the more visible project, and vendor payments as a
proxy for the less visible project. Using U.S. state level data from 1992 to 2008, we find that
FD causes a public expenditure flow from the more visible to the less visible project. This
result provides evidence for the visibility effect, and also confirms our theoretical findings
that FD can cause dress-up contests between local governments. To further investigate
the role of yardstick competition, we propose two yardstick competition measures based
on the comparability of jurisdictions and the competitiveness of local governments. We
estimate a difference-in-difference model and find that a stronger yardstick competition
leads to a stronger FD effect on the structure of public expenditure. This is another
evidence of dress-up contests. To capture how this distortion of public expenditure affects
poverty, we use a functional coefficient approach, and we estimate a pooled panel and
a panel with a fixed effect. This approach allows us to capture the possible nonlinear
interaction between the cash-vendor-payment (CV) ratio, welfare expenditure, and poverty.
We find that the distortion of public expenditure, measured by the CV ratio, can greatly
weaken the effect of welfare expenditure on poverty reduction, and this influence appears
to be nonlinear. Considering the possible endogeneity of welfare expenditure, we propose
using public expenditure on health and hospitals as an instrumental variable of welfare
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expenditure. Our analysis shows that this instrument is valid theoretically and statistically.
We thus empirically verify our theoretical findings, and provide empirical evidence for a
dark side to FD.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formally
model the causes and effects of dress-up contests in the presence of FD. Section 3 provides
empirical evidence for dress-up contests, and Sections 4 and 5 analyse the FD effect on
social welfare. Section 6 summarises and concludes.
2 The basic model
The basic model aims to illustrate how yardstick competition (dress-up contests), which
is introduced by FD, can affect politicians’ resource allocation to two types of public
goods, more visible and less visible goods. In practice, yardstick competition can arise in
two cases. First, two local politicians from the different (neighbouring) cities/towns are
ambitious for one position in the higher level government. Second, each local incumbent
politician competes with rivals to win his local election. If the rivals are cheap talkers,
then the competition pressure comes from the neighbouring jurisdictions, and it is the
performance of neighbouring politicians that help voters evaluate the capability of the
local incumbent. In both cases voters compare these two incumbents from the neighbouring
jurisdictions. The two cases are equivalent in modeling, and thus we only discuss the first
case for simplicity. Since voters can only infer politicians’ capability from public services,
politicians aim to establish a better image to win votes. However, an overemphasis on
image building can cause an efficiency loss in welfare expenditure, and further hurt social
welfare. In this section, we first derive the equilibrium of a one-shot game, and then analyse
the comparative statics, i.e. the impact of FD on this equilibrium.
2.1 Politicians
We follow Cai and Treisman (2005) and assume that politicians are partially self-interested,
caring both voters’ welfare and private interest. To model such partially self-interested
politicians, we first discuss an ideal social planner whose aim is to appropriately distribute
public resources (expenditure on public goods) to maximize the utility of the “society”.
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The utility function of the social planner is
UP =
J∑
j=1
υjzj − CP (e1, . . . , eJ) ,
s.t. I =
J∑
j=1
ej. (1)
In the utility function, zj is the observed outcome of the public good j, ej is the public
expenditure on public good j with the budget constraint I, and CP (·) is the social cost of
all public expenditure with C ′P (e) > 0 and C
′′
P (e) > 0. The social planner cares all public
goods with different weights υj. This is an ideal case. In practice, however, a politician
cares not only the social utility (benevolent), but also his own utility (self-interested), i.e.
wining the election. Assume that a politician put weight γ on the social utility, and (1−γ)
on his own utility, and he maximizes his expected payoff function
max
e1i,...,eJi
E(Ui) = γUP,i + (1− γ)Rηi − Ci (e1i, . . . , eJi) i ∈ {A,B},
s.t. Ii =
J∑
j=1
eji, (2)
where R is the return from winning the election, with R = 0 indicating failure. ηi is the
probability of winning the local election for the politician i. To win the future election,
each politician needs to provides evidence of his capability (such as public services) at the
cost C to convince voters. Note that C also depends on the public expenditure on J public
services, but C is different from Cp, representing the extra cost for the politician to provide
public goods besides social cost, e.g. management expenses, time, et al. We assume that
the first- and second-order derivatives of the cost function satisfy C(e)′ > 0 and C ′′(e) > 0.
The budget constraint also applies.
2.2 Voters
We assume that there are two types of voters: well-informed voters (proportion k) and
ill-informed voters (proportion 1 − k). Well-informed voters have their own ideology, i.e.
their political persuasions and preference on governmental behavior (for example, more
emphasis on defense or economic construction), and they make voting decisions based
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on the (inferred) capability of politicians and their ideology. If a politician’s political
persuasion is far away from a voter’s ideology, then the voter is less likely to vote for
this politician. Let s be the measure of a voter’s ideology which uniquely identifies every
voter. We assume that s is uniformly distributed between [0, 1]. Then the choice of voter
s depends on
pis,i =
Φi
Ds,i
i ∈ {A,B} , (3)
where Φi is the inferred capability of politician i, Ds,i is the difference between the voter’s
ideology and politician i’s political persuasions. More particularly, voter s chooses to
support politician A if pis,A > pis,B and vice versa. If we assume, without loss of generality,
that politician A is the left wing, and B is the right, then Ds,A = s, and Ds,B = 1 − s.
Given the inferred capabilities of the two politicians (which we shall discuss in details in the
next subsection), we can compute the position of the marginal voter sˆ that is indifference
to politician A and B, that is pis,A = pis,B. This leads to an indifference marginal voter
sˆ =
ΦA
ΦA + ΦB
(4)
This threshold value sˆ also determines the share of well-informed voters supporting A and
B. A simple calculation shows that well-informed voters with s < sˆ will support A, while
those with s > sˆ will support B, i.e.
SA = sˆ =
ΦA
ΦA + ΦB
SB = 1− sˆ = ΦB
ΦA + ΦB
. (5)
The ill-informed voters do not have ideology, and they make decisions randomly. We
assume that politicians A and B equally share the votes of ill-informed voters. Then the
probability of politician i to win election can be written as
ηi = kSi +
(1− k)
2
i ∈ {A,B} , (6)
and we always have ηA + ηB = 1.
2.3 Assessing politicians’ capability
To model the dress-up contest, we consider two types of public goods: more visible goods
a and less visible goods b. According to Mani and Mukand (2007), public goods are less
visible if it is hard to assess governmental competence based on their observed outcome.
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Politicians need to allocate their limited resources to these two types of goods, and voters
can then infer their capability. Following Mani and Mukand (2007), we assume that the
production function of each good is
zj,i = τi + ej,i + j,i j ∈ {a, b}, i ∈ {A,B}, (7)
where zj,i is the observed outcome of the public good j provided by politician i, τi is
politician i’s capability, ej,i is politician i’s expenditure or effort on good j, and j,i ∼
N
(
0, σ2j,i
)
captures the exogenous stochastic factors. Public good a being more visible
than b implies that there is more noise in the outcome of b than in that of a, i.e. σ2a, i < σ
2
b, i.
Mani and Mukand (2007) provided two reasons for visibility differences. First, the outcome
of some goods is intrinsically harder to directly observe or measure (e.g. those with short-
term results are typically more visible than those that are long term). Second, some public
goods are more ‘complex’ in the sense that their outcome is affected by a variety of factors
other than governmental competence. For example, the quantity and quality of education
is not determined only by governmental input, but also by teachers, parents, and peers.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, politicians are assumed to have the same
values of τ and j.
Voters can observe the outcome of the public good z as well as the expenditure e.
The politician’s capability τ is unobserved, but voters have common knowledge of its
prior distribution, τi ∼ N (τ , σ2τ ) for i ∈ {A,B}. Voters (with rational expectations) can
use the observed outcome zi := {za,i, zb,i} and the public expenditure e∗i := {e∗a,i, e∗b,i} to
update their priors of the politicians’ capability, i.e. from τ to (zj,i − e∗j,i) with associated
variance σ2j,i. According to Mani and Mukand (2007), the mean posterior assessment of
the politician’s capability can be obtained via
Φi = E (τi | zi, e∗i ) =
[
hττ + ha
(
za,i − e∗a,i
)
+ hb
(
zb,i − e∗b,i
)
hτ + ha + hb
]
,
where hτ = 1/σ
2
τ and hj = 1/σ
2
j (j = a, b) are the precision of the prior and two realizations,
respectively.
2.4 Equilibrium
Given the preference of voters, politician choose their strategies on ea, i and eb, i in a one-
shot game simultaneously. We first look at the strategy of politician A. The optimization
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problem (2) gives the first order condition
γυ − γC ′P,A (ea,A) + (1− γ) ·Rk ·
(
ha
hτ + ha + hb
)
· ΦA
(ΦA + ΦB)
2 − C ′A (ea,A)− λ = 0
where λ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Since we have assumed the budget constraint is binding,
λ must not be equal to zero, and the optimal expenditure e?a,A = arg max {E (UA)}. The
case for politician B is symmetric.
2.5 Comparative statics
Based on the analysis above, we can examine how FD affects the politicians’ behaviour,
i.e. their public expenditure on the two types of goods, ea,i and eb,i. FD can be regarded
as a trigger of yardstick competition, which strengthens the information externality, and
gives the voters more knowledge of the politicians’ capabilities. This thus increases the
proportion of well-informed voters, i.e. k, because information externality facilitates voters
to detect and compare the public services, and further increases the comparability between
the politicians in the neighboring jurisdictions. Therefore, we analyse the effect of FD by
investigating how an increase in k affects the equilibrium.
We study the behavior of politician A. Define FA := ∂Ê(UA)
∗/∂ea,A, and we have
FA = γυ − γC ′P,A (ea,A) + (1− γ)Rk ·
(
ha
hτ + ha + hb
)
· ΦA
(ΦA + ΦB)
2 − C ′A (ea,A)− λ.
Note that we always have
∂FA
∂k
= (1− γ)R ·
(
ha
hτ + ha + hb
)
· ΦA
(ΦA + ΦB)
2 > 0,
and
∂FA
∂ea,A
= −γC ′′P,A (ea,A)− 2 (1− γ) ·Rk ·
(
ha
hτ + ha + hb
)2
· ΦA
(ΦA + ΦB)
3 − C ′′A (ea,A) < 0.
Therefore, using the implicit function theorem, we obtain the following inequality at equi-
librium
∂ea,A
∂k
= −
(
∂FA
∂k
)
/
(
∂FA
∂ea,A
)
> 0. (8)
This shows that as k increases, politician A spends more on more visible public goods.
Given the binding budget constraint, the expenditure on less visible goods thus shrinks.
The analysis of politician B is similar, and we also have ∂ea,B/∂k > 0.
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To summarise, our model shows that when k increases (more well-informed voters),
politicians tend to focus more on establishing a good image. Given a binding fiscal budget
constraint, more visible goods are more efficient at demonstrating capability and establish-
ing a good image. This explains why expenditure on more visible goods increases under
FD. However, an overemphasis on visible goods can lead to a structural bias in the public
expenditure, and thus hurt social welfare. This implies that politicians’ focus on their im-
age may have a negative effect on social welfare. We investigate these theoretical findings
empirically in the following sections.
3 Evidence for a dress-up contest
Our empirical analysis has two goals. The first is to provide evidence for the association
between FD and dress-up contests. Second, we ask how dress-up contests affect poverty,
an important aspect of social welfare. We address the first issue in this section, and the
second in the following two sections. We use U.S. state level data, and our sample covers
48 states excluding Alaska and Hawaii with the time span from 1992 to 2008.
A key issue is how to determine the more visible and less visible public goods. It is
difficult to find a strictly visible public good in the real world because the outcome of most
such goods is determined by a number of factors beyond the government’s control and
is difficult to observe or measure. We focus on poverty, and we consider cash assistance
to be relatively visible and vendor payments to be less visible. Cash assistance directly
increases citizens’ disposable income and reduces poverty. Hence, its outcome, i.e. poverty
reduction, can be observed in the short term, and it primarily depends on the government’s
expenditure on this service. In contrast, vendor payments (welfare expenditure excluding
cash assistance) are made to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other com-
modities. The outcome of these payments depends on a large number of factors beyond
the government’s control, such as the performance of other institutes, and it may not be
obvious in the short term. To appreciate these two measures, we need to distinguish be-
tween two concepts: visibility and visuality. Public services are visible if their outcomes
are affected by less noisy factors, while they are visual if their outcomes are easily observed
by voters. Some of the items of vendor payment can be visual, such as activities of soup
kitchen. However, they are still less visible than cash because the outcome of these pay-
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ment depends on the performance of intermediate institute, i.e. soup kitchen. Therefore, it
is reasonable to regard cash assistance as more visible and vendor payments as less visible.
We provide evidence to show the existence of a dress-up contest. Since it is difficult
to exactly identify all the transmission channels, we use evidence from different sources to
rule out possible alternative explanations.
3.1 FD effect on public-expenditure structure
We first consider a direct test for the causal effect of FD on dress-up contests. To outline
our empirical strategy, we introduce some preliminary notation. Assume that state-level
politicians spend 1/vS of the state expenditure on visible projects, while local-level politi-
cians spend 1/vL of the local expenditure on such projects. Since yardstick competition
is more fierce in local elections than in state elections, we have vS > vL ≥ 1. If we let Γ
be the total (state + local) public expenditure, and let D be the degree of FD, then the
total expenditure on the more visible project (cash assistance) and that on the less visible
project (vendor payments) are given by
Cash =
Γ
vS
+ ΓD
(
1
vL
− 1
vS
)
and Vendor = Γ− Cash = Γ
(
1− D
vL
+
D− 1
vS
)
.
The ratio of Cash to Vendor (hereafter the CV ratio) is
RCV =
vL + D(vS − vL)
vL(vS − 1)−D(vS − vL) .
Note that RCV is a monotonically increasing function of the degree of FD, i.e.
∂RCV
∂D
=
vSvL(vS − vL)
[(vS − 1)vL −D(vS − vL)]2
> 0. (9)
Therefore, as the degree of FD increases, the total expenditure on cash and the CV ratio
both increase. Inequality (9) thus allows us to empirically test the direct association
between FD and dress-up contests.
To test this association, we consider the reduced-form model
RCVit = αi + κ0 + κ1Dit + κ2TWEit + εit, (10)
where the subscript it denotes observation of the ith state (i = 1, . . . , N) at year t (t =
1, . . . , T ), and αi is the individual-specific effect. D represents the degree of FD, and we
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measure it by
D :=
Local public expenditure
Total public expenditure
,
where the local expenditure includes the expenditure of the county, city, and town govern-
ments, and the total expenditure is the expenditure of the state and local governments.
TWE is the total (state + local) welfare expenditure. The fixed-effect estimation results1
are given in column (1) of Table 1. It shows that a larger degree of FD is associated
with a larger CV ratio, and the correlation is strong and robust. In columns (2) and (3),
we replace the contemporary FD D by its first- and second-order lagged values DL1 and
DL2, respectively, to capture the causal effect, since an FD policy may take effect after a
period of time. We see that using lagged values gives a more positive and more significant
estimate, confirming the causal relationship between FD and the CV ratio.
Table 1: FD effect on CV ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D 0.4849
(2.43)
DL1 0.5018
(2.67)
DL2 0.4888
(3.06)
DCT 2.3915
(2.77)
TWE −0.2464 −0.2539 −0.2270 −0.2760
(−9.78) (−10.26) (−10.06) (−5.68)
CONST 0.2430 0.2484 0.2233 0.2532
(7.83) (8.40) (8.58) (6.86)
As a robustness check, we recompute the FD ratio using the expenditure from only the
city and town governments (excluding the county-level governments), and we denote this
ratio DCT . Since yardstick competition is supposed to be more intense at the city and town
level, we expect to observe a stronger association between dress-up contests and FD, i.e. a
1A preliminary analysis suggests the fixed-effect model is more appropriate than the random-effect
model.
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more significant and positive estimated coefficient κ1. The results in column (4) indeed
indicate a more significant effect, showing the robustness of this finding.
3.2 The role of yardstick competition
Yardstick competition plays a crucial role in the theoretical model, so we introduce it into
our empirical analysis. Since FD distorts the structure of public expenditure through the
channel of yardstick competition, we expect that the stronger the yardstick competition, the
stronger the distortion. More formally, if the local-level yardstick competition is intensified,
i.e. vL is smaller, then the CV ratio increases, because
∂RCV
∂vL
= − Dv
2
S
[(vS − 1)vL −D(vS − vL)]2
< 0.
This implies that given the same degree of FD, if the local-level yardstick competition
is stronger in a particular state, then the politicians in that state have more incentive to
invest in visible projects. In other words, the degree of yardstick competition can affect the
impact of FD on the structure of public expenditure. This mechanism can be empirically
captured by an interaction term between yardstick competition and FD. Thus, we consider
the model
RCVit = αi + κ0 + κ1Dit + κ2COMPit + κ3Dit × COMPit + κ4TWEit + εit, (11)
where COMP is a measure of the yardstick competition. Estimating (11) allows us to
identify the mechanism described in Section 2, at least to some extent.
Yardstick competition is a difficult concept to measure, and to the best of our knowl-
edge there is no satisfactory measure in the literature. We propose two measures based on
the comparability of jurisdictions and the competitiveness of local governments. First, we
consider the comparability of jurisdictions. This is motivated by the argument of Boden-
stein and Ursprung (2005) that yardstick competition ‘emerges when the performance of
governments in various jurisdictions becomes sufficiently comparable so that the voters can
alleviate the agency problem by making meaningful comparisons between jurisdictions’; see
also Besley and Case (1995). In the U.S., most congressional districts consist of several
local governments that have similar political and economic situations, such as similar po-
litical interests and voters’ preferences. Hence, we expect that the yardstick competition
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between local governments within a congressional district is stronger than that outside the
district. This implies that the congressional district demarcates the political boundaries
of the yardstick competition. If a given district contains more local governments, then
the yardstick competition in this district is more intense because each local government
has more comparable rivals. Given this motivation, we propose to measure the yardstick
competition by
COMPr :=
Number of local governments
Number of congressional districts
.
This ratio is unaffected if we control for a state’s land size or population since we divide
both the numerator and denominator by the land size or population.
Next, we consider measuring the yardstick competition by the competitiveness of the
local elections, which is computed based on the percentage of votes won by the leading
party. We denote this measure as COMPc. The average level of competitiveness is a
reasonable measure of the yardstick competition within the state. The competitiveness is
higher if the leading party wins a smaller share of the votes, suggesting that the competing
parties are well matched or none of the candidates has strong support. In both cases,
the yardstick competition can be intense. Due to the lack of county-level data, we use
congressional-district data. In the two-party system of the U.S., congressional elections
are expected to be highly correlated with local (county, city, or town) elections, and thus
the average competitiveness of these elections can be a proxy for the yardstick competition
at the local level.
To see how the FD effect varies at different levels of competitiveness, we first rank
all the states according to their average competitiveness (averaged over time). Then, we
estimate the FD effect using two samples, made up of the most competitive and the least
competitive states. Columns (1)–(4) of Table 2 present the results. It is clear that the
FD effect on the CV ratio is much stronger and more significant in the more competitive
states. Next, we examine the interaction effect of competitiveness more formally by esti-
mating the panel data model (11). The results are given in columns (5)–(8) of Table 2.
We see that the interaction terms are strongly positive when using COMPr and strongly
negative when using COMPc in the models with contemporary and lagged FD. This again
confirms that a stronger yardstick competition leads to a stronger FD effect on the CV
ratio. The significance of the level terms D and COMP depends on the measurement of the
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yardstick competition. COMP is significant but D is not when we measure the competition
by COMPr; and D is significant but COMP is not when we measure the competition by
COMPc. In the difference-in-difference model, the coefficients of the level terms capture
only an ‘initial’ effect. The different significance levels suggest that COMPr and COMPc
measure the yardstick competition from different perspectives. Since the size of the inter-
action term in columns (5) and (6) is much larger than that in columns (7) and (8), and is
also larger than the size of its level terms, we find that the results from the two measures
are generally consistent: a larger degree of FD and more intense yardstick competition are
associated with a higher CV ratio.
To summarise, the above analysis shows that a high degree of FD is associated with
an expenditure flow from the more visible product (cash assistance) to the less visible
product (vendor payments), and the association is even stronger in regions with more
intense yardstick competition. This is because to achieve a better image and win more
votes, politicians tend to allocate more resources to the more visible project. This dress-up
contest is intensified by FD through the channel of yardstick competition. These empirical
results thus provide support for our theoretical findings.
4 FD effect on poverty
We have seen, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, that fiscal FD can cause a
dress-up contest which forces governments to allocate more expenditure to the more visible
public goods. In the following two sections, we investigate how this distortion of public
expenditure influences social welfare. We focus on the effect of FD on the poverty rate, an
important aspect of social welfare, and empirically identify the transmission mechanisms.
For this purpose, we introduce three additional variables: poverty (p), unemployment rate
(UNEM), and Gini index (GINI). Poverty is defined by the share of people with an income
lower than the standard income, and this standard differs across states. A more detailed
description of the variables and their sources is given in the Appendix.
We focus on three channels from FD to poverty, which are summarised in Figure 1. First,
according to the two-politician model in Section 2, FD can affect poverty through the dress-
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Table 2: Interaction between FD, yardstick competition, and CV ratio
15 most competitive 15 least competitive Entire sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D 0.7432 0.5789 −0.0900 0.4929 0.0599 0.8393
(4.91) (2.52) (−0.40) (1.55) (0.39) (2.92)
DL1 0.1178 0.9182
(0.79) (3.60)
TWE −0.2923 −0.2769 −0.2804 −0.2195 −0.2636 −0.2668 −0.2457 −0.2536
(−8.00) (−4.94) (−8.76) (−6.50) (−11.90) (−12.39) (−10.24) (−10.64)
COMPr
√ √ −2.4494 −2.7143
(−3.56) (−4.01)
COMPc
√ √ −0.0004 −0.0004
(−0.66) (−0.56)
D×COMPr 6.9800
(3.91)
D×COMPc −0.0067
(−2.24)
DL1 × COMPr 6.3943
(4.05)
DL1 × COMPc −0.0081
(−3.05)
CONST 0.2590 0.2591 0.3086 0.2328 0.3266 0.3335 0.2661 0.2722
(8.07) (3.68) (8.62) (8.74) (11.50) (12.54) (5.93) (5.90)
Note: Columns (1) and (2) use the 15 most competitive states, based on COMPr and COMPc, respectively;
columns (3) and (4) use the 15 least competitive states, based on COMPr and COMPc, respectively;
columns (5) and (6) use the entire sample of 48 states.
Figure 1: Transmission channels from FD to poverty
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up contest, i.e. an expenditure flow from less visible goods to more visible goods (effects A
and B). Second, FD can indirectly affect poverty by affecting the welfare expenditure
(effects C and D). On the one hand, FD may increase the welfare expenditure due to
higher administrative costs; on the other hand, it is likely that welfare expenditure shrinks
after FD because the mobility of the poor motivates governments to spend less on welfare
to reduce the fiscal burden. It is not clear which effect dominates, and we investigate this
in our empirical study. Finally, in addition to the indirect effects, FD can have an impact
on poverty through channels other than welfare expenditure and dress-up contests. We
consider other connections between FD and poverty as effect E. We observe that the CV
ratio influences poverty not directly but indirectly, by changing the structure of welfare
expenditure. Hence, the arrow line of effect B does not point at poverty but at effect D. We
use a dashed line for channel D since there is potential reverse causality between welfare
expenditure and poverty, which we will investigate using instrumental variables.
4.1 Standard panel data
To provide empirical evidence for the transmission channels described in Figure 1, we first
identify each effect A–E separately. First, we examine the transmission channel from FD to
welfare expenditure, and then to poverty, namely effects C and D. To show the mediation
of the welfare expenditure, we estimate the following models:
TWEit = αi + θ0 + θ1Dit + eit, (12)
pit = αi + β0 + β1Dit + β2TWEit + β3UNEMit + β4GINIit + it. (13)
Model (12) captures the transmission effect C, while (13) captures the direct effect of FD
on poverty (effect E) and the indirect effect through welfare expenditure (effect D).
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 3 present the standard fixed-effect estimation results based
on Equations (12) and (13). Column (1) shows that FD has a strongly negative effect
on welfare expenditure. Column (2) replaces the contemporary value of FD by its first-
order lagged value DL1, and shows a similar result, confirming that a high degree of FD
leads to less welfare expenditure. This suggests that the negative effect of FD on welfare
expenditure dominates in our case. In particular, since the poor are mobile, an increase
of welfare expenditure in one jurisdiction attracts the poor to this region, which adds
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Table 3: Results for separate transmission channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TWE TWE p p p p p
D −1.1031 7.4507 5.4731 4.7246 3.3062 4.6255
(−3.58) (4.54) (3.49) (2.29) (1.54) (1.82)
DL1 −1.0418
(−3.56)
TWE −1.7927 −2.2731 −0.4419 −2.3902
(−3.38) (−3.57) (−0.72) (−3.48)
GINI −0.1913 0.6650
(−0.08) (0.29)
UNEM 0.5519 0.5784
(6.07) (5.78)
RCV 4.5906 0.1824
(3.19) (0.13)
CONST 0.7922 0.7796 12.037 13.457 10.960 12.142 10.518
(28.15) (27.82) (80.16) (30.95) (8.46) (22.83) (8.00)
to the burden of this jurisdiction but reduces the burden of others. Therefore, if most
jurisdictions are free riders, then FD leads to a coordination failure and the inefficient
provision of public goods. Column (3) shows a significant and positive overall effect of FD
on poverty, challenging the conventional viewpoint that it has a positive impact on social
welfare. This effect is largely reduced (in size and significance) when we include welfare
expenditure (column (4)), but remains strong, and the coefficient of welfare expenditure
is significantly negative. This suggests that part of the FD effect on poverty is explained
by the intermediate transmission through welfare expenditure, and it provides evidence for
strong effects C and D. These effects are robust when we include the Gini coefficient and
unemployment (column (5)).
To examine effect B, we first add RCV as an explanatory variable in the poverty
regression. Columns (6) and (7) show that the FD effect remains strong and positive
after we control for welfare expenditure and the CV ratio, and this suggests the existence
of effect E. The strongly positive and robust effect of FD again confirms the negative effect
of FD on poverty reduction. The CV ratio is positively related to poverty, but this effect
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becomes insignificant when we control for unemployment and the Gini index. It shows that
the CV ratio can be positively related to poverty, but the delicate coefficient suggests that
the standard panel data model may not fully capture the effect of the CV ratio on poverty.
Also, we see that including RCV can affect the estimated coefficient of WE, which suggests
possible interactions between RCV and WE. In fact, the CV ratio influences poverty by
interacting with the effect of welfare expenditure. An excessively large (or small) CV ratio
reduces the effect of welfare expenditure on poverty reduction, while an appropriate value
of the ratio can maximise the effect of welfare expenditure. Therefore, effect B cannot be
fully captured by the standard fixed-effect model with RCV as a control variable, and more
appropriate methods are required.
4.2 Endogeneity of welfare expenditure
A potential issue is the endogeneity of welfare expenditure. The endogeneity is due to
possible reverse causality between welfare expenditure and poverty; in particular, welfare
expenditure can reduce poverty, while regions with a higher poverty rate are likely to
have more welfare expenditure. To reduce the potential bias caused by reverse causality,
we consider instrumental-variable estimation. We propose to use public expenditure on
health and/or hospitals as the instrumental variable of welfare expenditure. Expenditure
on health and hospitals is highly correlated with welfare expenditure because factors such
as citizens’ interest in government services, politicians’ attention to citizens’ wellbeing,
and the power of the public-sector unions can influence the expenditure on welfare, health,
and hospitals. Moreover, this instrument does not depend on poverty because government
hardly increase or reduce health expenditure for poverty reason. Also, there is no clear
transmission channels from public health expenditure on poverty other than welfare ex-
penditure. This is because only a proportion of public expenditure on health and hospital
may be distributed to individual health care, and only this part of expenditure is possibly
related with poverty. Even if part of public expenditure on health and hospital is related
with poverty, it is still unclear how much assistance to individual health expenditure can
alleviate poverty.Therefore, health and hospital expenditure satisfies the requirements of
relevance and exogeneity, so it is an appropriate instrumental variable. This instrument is
in the similar spirit of Levitt (2002) who used expenditure on fire fighting as an instrument
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of expenditure on police when investigating the determinants of crime.
Table 4: Results of poverty regression: IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument HE HO HH HH HEO HEO
D 3.5819 5.1961 4.4651 4.6046 4.0719 4.5837
(1.90) (2.56) (2.44) (2.44) (2.50) (2.54)
TWE −3.5619 −1.7413 −2.5657 −3.2093 −2.9985 −3.5670
(−2.87) (−1.14) (−2.25) (−1.73) (−3.05) (−2.06)
GINI 0.9078 −0.6449 0.0582 0.7794 0.4733 0.7590
(0.35) (−0.24) (0.02) (0.31) (0.18) (0.30)
UNEM 0.5360 0.5585 0.5483 0.5943 0.5424 0.6001
(8.75) (9.01) (9.03) (7.79) (9.12) (7.64)
RCV −0.9291 −1.4686
(−0.33) (−0.55)
First-stage F -stat. 122.13 75.64 146.95 76.61 80.98 38.27
p-value of first-stage F -test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p-value of Hansen’s J-test 0.24 0.24
Note: The dependent variable in all models is poverty. Columns (1)–(4) are 2SLS, and columns (5) and (6)
are GMM. Using 2SLS to estimate columns (5) and (6) leads to consistent results.
We consider four variations of the instrument: expenditure on health (HE), expenditure
on hospitals (HO), expenditure on health and hospitals (HH), and expenditure on health
together with expenditure on hospitals (HEO). In the first three cases, the model is exactly
identified, and we estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the last case, we
estimate the overidentified model using the generalised method of moments (GMM). The
results are presented in Table 4. We see that using the instrumental variable does not
change our results. In particular, the estimated coefficient of welfare expenditure using
2SLS/GMM remains significantly negative, and it is slightly larger (in absolute value) than
the standard fixed-effect coefficient estimate, except in column (2). The estimates of the
other covariates are generally unaffected when we use 2SLS. The first-stage F statistic and
its p-value show that the instruments are in general highly correlated with the endogenous
variable. However, the single-instrument HO is relatively weak compared with HE, and
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this explains the small absolute value of the welfare-expenditure coefficient in column (2).
In columns (5) and (6), the rejection of Hansen’s J test suggests that the overidentified
instruments satisfy the orthogonal conditions, and thus are valid instruments.
To conclude, the results from a separate estimation of each channel show that effects A–
E indeed exist. FD can have an impact on poverty by reducing welfare expenditure and,
more interestingly, through the CV ratio. However, we also note that the interaction
between poverty and the CV ratio (effect B) cannot be fully captured by the standard
panel data model, and more thorough studies will be required.
5 Joint estimation using functional coefficient model
The above analysis specifies each channel separately, and shows that each effect is strong
and significant. However, these channels may not be jointly strong and their relative
importance is not yet clear. For example, it is possible that the transmission channel
through the CV ratio (effects A and B) is individually significant, but plays a minor role
when we control the channel through the welfare expenditure. Also, the standard fixed-
effect model considered in the previous section cannot capture the interaction between
the CV ratio, welfare expenditure, and poverty. A frequently used method to capture the
interaction effect is difference-in-difference estimation:
pit = αi + β0 + β1Dit + β2TWEit + β4RCVit + β5TWEit × RCVit +
2∑
k=1
γkxit,k + it, (14)
where xit = (GINIit,UNEMit). We argue that this approach does not work here, for two
reasons. First, since RCV is influenced by D, the interaction term TWE × RCV can
be highly correlated with the level terms even if all the variables are centred to remove
multicollinearity, and therefore the estimated coefficient of the interaction term can be
inefficient. Second, the interaction term provides only a positive or negative (linear) inter-
action effect, and this effect is the same for all CV ratio levels. However, it is possible that
the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty depends nonlinearly on the CV ratio; in particu-
lar, both extremely large and small values of the CV ratio reflect the distortion of welfare
expenditure, and this distortion can weaken its effect on poverty reduction. Therefore, the
welfare-expenditure effect is expected to be a nonlinear function of the CV ratio (roughly
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U-shaped). This nonlinear relationship cannot be captured by Equation (14). Indeed,
estimates of Equation (14) show that βˆ5 is not significant.
5.1 Standard functional coefficient model
To investigate the relative importance of each channel and capture the possibly nonlinear
relationship between the CV ratio and poverty, we consider the functional coefficient model
in which the slope coefficients are allowed to vary over a common variable. We first consider
a standard functional coefficient model,
pit = δ0 + δ1Dit + δ2TWEit + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit, (15)
where the slope coefficient δk (k = 0, 1, . . . , 4) is a continuous function of the CV ratio. The
variables D, TWE, GINI, and UNEM in Equation (15) are the same as in Equation (13),
except that DINC is not included to avoid possible multicollinearity between TWE and
DINC. Our robustness check suggests that including DINC does not change the shape of
the curves, but just widens the confidence bands. One advantage of a functional coefficient
model is that it allows regressors to be correlated with the smoothing variable RCV, and
thus avoids the multicollinearity problem in (14). Moreover, it provides information on
how the effect of welfare expenditure varies (possibly nonlinearly) for different values of
the CV ratio. The model also allows us to rule out other possible transmission channels
from the CV ratio to poverty, at least to some extent, if the other functional coefficients (δ1,
δ3, and δ4) do not vary over RCV or show no clear trends. For the moment, we consider
a standard functional model without an individual-specific effect αi (pool estimation),
and the estimated coefficients are consistent if αi is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
regressors. In the next subsection we will allow correlation between αi and the regressors
and estimate a fixed-effect functional coefficient model.
The parameters in this model are estimated by local linear estimation (Fan and Gijbels
(1996); see also Cai et al. (2000)). Thus we specify
δk = δCk + δSk(RCV− u0) (k = 0, 1, . . . , 4) (16)
where min(RCV) ≤ u0 ≤ max(RCV). The parameters (δCk, δSk) are estimated by min-
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imising the following objective function:
min
δCk,δSk
∑
i
∑
t
(
pit −
4∑
k=0
{δCk + δSk(RCVit − u0)}xitk
)2
Kh(RCVit − u0),
where xitk is the kth regressor, and Kh(·) := h−1K(·/h) with bandwidth h and kernel
function K(·). Various data-driven methods could be used to select the bandwidth, e.g.
cross-validation (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). We choose the bandwidth by minimising the
averaged mean square error, following Cai et al. (2000).
Figure 2: Marginal effect of control variables on poverty as function of CV ratio (standard
functional coefficient model)
Figure 2 shows the slope parameters as a function of the CV ratio. The solid line plots
the coefficient estimate, and the dashed lines are ±2 × the bootstrap standard errors (cal-
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culated over 200 replications). We see a rough U-shape of the welfare-expenditure effect on
poverty (upper-left subfigure). The effect is significantly negative when the proporition of
the cash assistance is relatively small, and it becomes stronger (more negative) as the ratio
increases to around 0.2. However, when the ratio is more than 0.3, increasing the cash pro-
portion weakens the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty reduction, with wide confidence
bands. The effect even becomes weakly positive when the ratio is particularly high. The
nonlinear behaviour shows that a deviation of the CV ratio from its optimal value, and
in particular an increase in its value, can weaken the poverty-reduction effect of welfare
expenditure. This provides evidence for the efficiency loss caused by an overemphasis on
visible products.
The FD effect on poverty (upper-right subfigure) is significantly positive for values of
the CV ratio from around 0.1 to 0.4, and less significant for larger values. The estimated
functional coefficients of the welfare expenditure and FD confirm the results from the
standard fixed-effect model that the indirect channel (effects C and D) is strong, other
channels also matter (effect E), but the evidence for the direct effects (A and B) is not
as clear. We also see that the curves of FD, unemployment, and the Gini index have no
particular shape, suggesting that the CV ratio does not influence poverty through these
channels.
5.2 Fixed-effect functional coefficient model
Standard functional coefficient estimation works if the individual-specific effect αi is in-
dependent of the control variables. However, it is possible that an unobserved individual
effect αi is correlated with the control variables, for example, the historical and cultural
differences between states (an unobserved individual effect) may affect the government be-
haviour, and thus impact the degree of FD. To allow for possible correlation between the
individual-specific effect and the regressors, we estimate a fixed-effect functional coefficient
model:
pit = αi + δ0 + δ1Dit + δ2TWEit + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit, (17)
where αi can be correlated with the regressors in any (unknown) pattern. In a functional
coefficient model, the fixed effect cannot be removed by a preliminary step of first-difference
or within-transformation of the dependent and independent variables, because the slope
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coefficients δk = δk(RCVit) are no longer constant for all the observations. The transforma-
tion based on equations also does not work, because it involves an additive function that
impedes kernel-based estimation, and also because it produces an inconsistent estimated
coefficient of the time-invariant term (see Sun et al. (2009) for the details). Therefore, we
follow Sun et al. (2009) and remove the fixed effects by deducting a smoothed version of
the cross-time average from each individual unit. This approach first analytically finds the
fixed-effect vector via a weighted least square dummy variable model, and then estimates
the functional parameters nonparametrically using a concentrate weighted least square
method. To calculate the bootstrap standard error in the panel data model, we follow
Kapetanios (2008) and construct bootstrap samples by resampling whole cross-sectional
units with replacement (cross-sectional resampling).
Figure 3 presents the fixed-effect functional coefficient estimates for each control vari-
able. In general the shape of the curves is similar to those in the standard functional
coefficient model. In particular, the trends of the welfare-expenditure effect are consistent:
welfare expenditure has a significantly negative effect on poverty when the CV ratio is
low, but a weakly positive effect when the ratio is high (the U-shaped curve). Also, this
effect becomes less significant as the ratio increases. The estimated coefficients of FD are
below the zero line; they are much lower than those in the standard panel data model, even
though we observe only the upper bound of the confidence interval. Thus, FD has little
impact on the poverty rate if we control for the size (effects C and D) and the structure
(effects A and B) of welfare expenditure. The results for unemployment and the Gini index
show no particular trends.
In contrast to the standard estimation, the fixed-effect estimation results provide evi-
dence for both the direct channels (effects A and B) and indirect channels (effects C and
D), while the other channels (effect E) become relatively weak. In general, the harmful
effect of FD can be observed in the functional coefficient analysis when we take the fixed
effect into consideration.
5.3 Robustness check
We investigate the robustness of our results in various ways. First, we focus on the co-
efficient of TWE and consider different subsets of auxiliary variables {D, UNEM, GINI}.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of control variables on poverty as a function of CV ratio: Fixed-
effect estimation
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The results from both the standard and fixed-effect models show that including different
auxiliary variables does not affect the curves of the welfare-expenditure effect.
Second, we consider using an alternative data set, namely the local governments’ ex-
penditure on cash and vendor payments. To ensure that the ratio is well-defined, we assign
zero to those observations with no such assistance or payments.2 We estimate the func-
tional coefficient model using the local government expenditure. The left panel of Figure 4
shows that the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty is negative when RCV is small but
weakly positive when RCV is large. This result is consistent with our previous findings.
The larger confidence bands for small values of RCV are partly because we assign zero to
those observations with no assistance or payments, which reduces the accuracy.
Finally, we consider the possible effect of lagged variables. This captures the causal
effect, and using the lagged value can also reduce the endogeneity to some extent. We
consider the following model:
pit = αi + δ0 + δ1Di,t−1 + δ2TWEi,t−1 + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit, (18)
where δk is a function of RCVi,t−1. In this model, we take a first-order lag of the control
variables D and TWE together with the smoothing covariate RCV, because they are related
to the fiscal policies. We estimate (18) using both standard and fixed-effect models, and
the right panel of Figure 4 shows that our main results are not affected.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper models and empirically identifies the dress-up contest introduced by FD and
its harmful effect on social welfare. Because of asymmetric information, voters cannot
observe politicians’ capabilities, but they make assessments based on the outcome of public
projects. Therefore politicians, under election pressures, are motivated to allocate more
resources to more visible projects to improve their image. We show that the yardstick
competition triggered by FD can turn into a competition for a better image, i.e. a dress-
up contest, and this contest further causes a structural bias in public expenditure (more
expenditure on visible projects) and reduces the efficiency of public expenditure.
2Setting these observations to zero cannot distinguish the case with no cash and vendor payments from
the case with vendor payments but no cash assistance.
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Figure 4: Functional coefficient estimates of welfare-expenditure effect: Robustness check
(a) Estimates using local data (b) Estimates using lagged variables
Our empirical analysis first examined each transmission channel separately using the
standard panel data model, and found that each effect is individually strong. On the one
hand, FD significantly reduces the welfare expenditure, and thus further increases poverty.
On the other hand, it encourages governments to spend more on visible projects, leading
to a higher CV ratio in welfare expenditure. To capture the possible nonlinear interaction
between CV ratio, welfare expenditure, and poverty, and also to examine the relative
importance of each channel, we estimated the effects jointly using the functional coefficient
panel data model. It showed that the transmission effects through welfare expenditure
and the CV ratio are both nontrivial. An excessively large CV ratio weakens the poverty-
reduction effect of welfare expenditure because of the efficiency loss. Separate estimation
and joint estimation together provide supporting evidence for the positive effect of FD
on poverty, and our results are robust to different model specifications. Therefore, our
empirical analysis suggests that FD in general has a dark side that can lead to a higher
level of poverty through a dress-up contest.
Our main results have important policy implications. Policymakers, who consider FD
to be an efficient policy tool, should also be aware of its dark side. Two methods can help
to avoid dress-up contests and their negative effects on social welfare in the course of FD.
First, there should be a minimum level of public expenditure on less visible projects, so
that the structure of public spending does not become too distorted. Second, an evaluation
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system could be introduced to increase the visibility of public projects, such as the CPA
(comprehensive performance assessment) system used in the UK since 2002. Such an
assessment system would allow voters to better evaluate politicians’ capabilities.
Further research is needed in several areas. First, we plan to use an alternative measure
of yardstick competition to provide further evidence for dress-up contests. Second, there
are missing values in the current data set, and a better data set is thus required. Finally,
we will consider functional coefficient estimation in the presence of instrumental variables.
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Appendix
Detailed data description
p Regional poverty rate. The share of people with an income lower than the regional
standard (varying over regions), from 1992 to 2008. Source: Statistical Abstract.
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D Fiscal decentralisation. Defined as
D =
local expenditure
local expenditure + state expenditure
,
where state expenditure refers to the expenditure by the state government, and local
expenditure is the expenditure by all local governments. Source: Statistical Abstract.
UNEM Unemployment rate, from 1992 to 2008. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
COMPr Yardstick competition based on the comparability of jurisdictions, the ratio of the
number of local governments over the number of congressional districts.
COMPc Yardstick competition based on the competitiveness of local governments, the per-
centage of votes won by the leading party, from 1992 to 2008.
TWE Welfare expenditure. Total public welfare per thousand persons measured in thou-
sands of dollars, from 1992 to 2008 excluding 2000, 2002, and 2006. Source: Statistical
Abstract.
RCV The ratio of cash assistance to vendor payments. In this ratio, cash assistance is
paid directly to needy persons under the categorical programs (Old Age Assistance,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)) and any other welfare programs.
Vendor payments are made directly to private purveyors for medical care, burials,
and other commodities and services provided under welfare programs; and for the
provision and operation by the government of welfare institutions. Source: Statistical
Abstract.
GINI Gini index. Source: Statistical Abstract.
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